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THE GOVERNMENT BRAND 
Mary-Rose Papandrea
ABSTRACT—In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that Texas could deny the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans a specialty license plate because the public found the 
group’s Confederate flag logo offensive. The Court did not reach this 
conclusion because it deemed the Confederate flag to fall within a category 
of unprotected speech, such as true threats, incitement, or fighting words; 
because it revisited its determination in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul that 
restrictions on hate speech are unconstitutional; because travelers who see 
the license plates are a “captive audience”; or because Texas had a 
compelling interest in disassociating itself from a symbol that it regarded as 
promoting racial discrimination. Instead, the Court held that Texas was 
entitled to ban Confederate flags because all speech appearing on specialty 
license plates constitutes government speech immune to the usual 
restrictions of the First Amendment. 
This Article dissects Walker and its larger significance for the 
government speech doctrine. This case takes the Court’s growing deference 
to institutional government actors and puts it on steroids. Relying heavily 
on a “reasonable person” inquiry, Walker suggests that it will frequently be 
“reasonable” for people to believe that the government has endorsed 
private speech appearing on public property or spoken by a public 
employee or student. But under well-established First Amendment 
principles, the government’s tolerance of private expression is not the same 
as endorsement. The Article examines the dangerous implications of 
Walker in a wide variety of contexts, from the speech rights of public 
school students and government employees, to advertisements on public 
transportation, and to new means of communication.  
AUTHOR—Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. Many 
thanks to the participants in this Symposium as well as UNC’s Summer 
Supreme Court Series for their thoughtful comments and insights on the 
topic of this paper. I am also very grateful to Alexander Tsesis for inviting 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Roberts Court has generally provided robust constitutional 
protection to offensive speech. This Court has struck down laws restricting 
“crush” animal videos,1 the sale of violent video games to children,2 and 
dissemination of intentional lies about military honors.3 It has also 
defended the right of the hateful Westboro Baptist Church to protest 
outside a funeral.4 But in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc., the Court held that Texas could deny a specialty license 
plate application to the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) because the 
public found the group’s Confederate flag logo offensive.5 The Court did 
not reach this conclusion because it deemed the Confederate flag to fall 
within a category of unprotected speech, such as true threats,6 incitement,7 
or fighting words;8 because it revisited its determination in R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul that restrictions on hate speech are unconstitutional;9 because 
travelers who see the license plates are a “captive audience”;10 or because 
Texas had a compelling interest in disassociating itself from a symbol that 
1 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481–82 (2010). 
2 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741–42 (2011). 
3 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
4 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011). 
5 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015). 
6 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003). 
7 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
8 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
9 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
10 See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion) (noting 
that advertising on public transportation runs “the risk of imposing upon a captive audience”). 
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it regarded as promoting racial discrimination.11 Instead, the Court held that 
Texas was entitled to ban Confederate flags because all speech appearing 
on specialty license plates constitutes government speech immune to the 
usual restrictions of the First Amendment.12 
In his dissent, Justice Alito declared that the majority’s “capacious 
understanding of government speech takes a large and painful bite out of 
the First Amendment.”13 This bold statement is noteworthy given that 
Justice Alito does not have a track record as a particularly speech-
protective Justice.14 He is also the author of the majority opinion in 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,15 the case upon which the Walker 
majority purportedly relies. 
This Article dissects Walker and its larger significance for the 
government speech doctrine. Walker is a potentially explosive decision 
with even more significant ramifications than Justice Alito contemplated. 
Walker’s expansive view of the government speech doctrine grants state 
actors broad authority to restrict private speech. This case takes the Court’s 
growing deference to government institutional actors and puts it on 
steroids, allowing the government to disfavor private speech in the name of 
protecting its image—its brand—in a wide variety of contexts, from 
schools to public employment, and to advertisements on municipal 
transportation to any number of new communications forums. 
Part I discusses the brief and troubled history of the government 
speech doctrine. Part II takes a closer look at the test for government 
speech the Court embraced in Walker and why this test potentially expands 
the government speech doctrine dramatically. Part III argues that Walker’s 
expansion of the doctrine is disturbing because it potentially permits the 
government to silence private speakers whenever a reasonable person 
11 Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding the denial of a tax 
exemption to a school that practiced race discrimination satisfied strict scrutiny given the government’s 
compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education). Relatedly, the Court did not 
embrace the suggestion some scholars have made that the government should not be required to provide 
a platform for hateful speech. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Government’s Ability to Compel and 
Restrict Speech, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253, 1258 (2011) (arguing government should be able to 
“set up speech platforms without providing the opportunity for some persons or groups to cause 
message-based harm to other persons or groups based on race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, 
gender, sexual orientation, or other characteristics on the basis of which we think it proper to offer 
people protection”). 
12 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015). 
13 Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
14 See Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito’s Lonely War Against Abhorrent, Low-Value 
Expression: A Malleable First Amendment Philosophy Privileging Subjective Notions of Morality and 
Merit, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 115–21 (2011). 
15 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
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might believe the government is endorsing that speech. This is because 
Walker suggests that it will frequently be “reasonable” for people to believe 
that the government has endorsed private speech appearing on public 
property or spoken by a public employee or student. But the government is 
not a private entity entitled to protect its brand from dilution. Under well-
established First Amendment principles, the government is not permitted to 
interfere with the speech of private speakers whenever it dislikes their 
expression. By focusing on whether reasonable observers believe this 
tolerance operates as endorsement, the Court’s new approach to the 
government speech doctrine threatens the future of free speech rights in this 
country. Part III examines the dangerous implications of Walker in a wide 
variety of contexts, from student speech rights to government employees to 
advertisements on public transportation. 
I. A BRIEF AND TROUBLED HISTORY
The First Amendment does not restrict the government’s ability to 
speak.16 After all, “‘[i]t is not easy to imagine how government could 
function if it lacked th[e] freedom’ to select the messages it wishes to 
convey.”17 For example, a government program encouraging vaccinations 
or recycling should not be required to discourage people from those 
things.18 The First Amendment does not serve as a “check” on the 
government’s expression; ballot box accountability does.19 
It is hardly controversial that the government must speak to be 
effective and that it need not embrace opposing viewpoints whenever it 
does. The real crux of the problem, however, is determining when in fact 
the government is speaking.20 This Part sketches the brief and troubled 
history of the Court’s government speech doctrine and then turns to outline 
the pre-Walker dispute in the lower courts about how to deal with license 
plates and other cases where government and private speech are arguably 
intertwined. 
16 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245–46. 
17 Id. at 2246 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 468). 
18 See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment does not mandate a viewpoint-neutral government. Government 
must choose between rival ideas and adopt some as its own: competition over cartels, solar energy over 
coal, weapon development over disarmament, and so forth. Moreover, the government may enlist the 
assistance of those who believe in its ideas to carry them to fruition; and it need not enlist for that 
purpose those who oppose or do not support the ideas.”). 
19 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245–46. 
20 See Summum, 555 U.S. at 470 (“There may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a 
government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech . . . .”). 
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A. From Rust to Open Society
The Court has struggled to determine what constitutes government 
speech in a variety of contexts, and the result is a hodgepodge of cases 
lacking coherence. 
The Court has suggested that the government speech doctrine is 
potentially implicated in five general contexts: (1) the government using 
third parties to express a specific, substantive government policy;21 (2) 
government programs that condition the receipt of federal funds on the 
forfeiture of speech rights;22 (3) the administration of a government 
program that inherently requires selective discretion, such as those 
involving the arts,23 libraries,24 or television broadcasts;25 (4) the apparent 
government endorsement of private speech;26 and (5) restrictions on 
government employee speech.27 Restrictions on expressive speech in public 
schools that “students, parents, and members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school” also rest on the 
government speech doctrine, although the Court has not been explicit about 
this.28 This taxonomy is not rigid; “the typologies do not arise in isolation, 
but instead often interact with one another.”29 For example, the line 
between using third parties to express the government’s message and the 
conditioning of subsidies on the forfeiture of other constitutional rights is 
21 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557–67 (2005) (rejecting challenge to 
government advertisement promoting beef consumption which was funded by individual beef 
producers). 
22 All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2330; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991). 
23 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580–90 (1998) (rejecting challenge to 
“decency” restriction on government arts funding). 
24 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality opinion) (noting public 
libraries “necessarily consider content in making collection decisions and enjoy broad discretion in 
making them”). 
25 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (finding that public 
television broadcasters necessarily exercise editorial discretion). 
26 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009). 
27 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment does not 
protect a government employee speaking within the scope of his job responsibilities). 
28 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). The articulated basis for this 
decision was not the government speech doctrine, which had not been recognized at that point, but 
rather the importance of deferring to the importance of controlling speech as part of the educational 
process. Id. at 270–73. At the same time, the Court did state that preexisting First Amendment 
principles did not provide the appropriate standard “for determining when a school may refuse to lend 
its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression,” id. at 272–73, which sounds a lot 
like the government speech doctrine. Indeed, the Court has subsequently suggested that Hazelwood 
involves the government’s own speech. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 834 (1995) (citing Hazelwood as an example of a case involving the government’s own speech). 
29 Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1377, 1384 (2001). 
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hardly a bright one.30 Similarly, the explicit or implicit endorsement of 
private speech can arguably involve some sort of government subsidy; in 
some cases, the endorsement is arguably classifiable as the government 
itself speaking through third parties. Restrictions on government employee 
speech might be regarded as equivalent to the government’s right to control 
subsidized speech. 
The government speech doctrine permits the government to do what it 
otherwise would not be able to do. Under current First Amendment 
doctrine, the government may not favor or disfavor speakers on the basis of 
the content of their messages.31 Viewpoint-based speech restrictions are a 
particularly “egregious form of content discrimination”32 because they 
“raise[] the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas 
or viewpoints from the marketplace.”33 The presumption that viewpoint-
based speech restrictions are unconstitutional applies even when the 
government has created a forum for private expression.34 
The government speech doctrine and the public forum doctrine often 
exist in tension with each other.35 The Court was asked to choose between 
the government speech doctrine and the public forum doctrine in Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum.36 In this case, the Court had to determine whether a 
city was entitled to make content-based determinations about which 
monuments to accept for permanent display in its park.37 In determining 
that permanent monuments represent government speech, the Court seemed 
to return to an argument it had long rejected: namely, that the government 
has a right to control its property the same way that private property owners 
do.38 In addition, the Court rejected arguments that the government speech 
30 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991). 
31 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those that target 
speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified 
only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”). 
32 Id. at 2230 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829). 
33 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 
(1991). 
34 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836–37 (holding a university could not discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint when distributing student activity funds). 
35 The Court recognized this tension as early as Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 199–200 (“[T]he 
existence of a Government ‘subsidy,’ in the form of Government-owned property, does not justify the 
restriction of speech in areas that have ‘been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity,’ or 
have been ‘expressly dedicated to speech activity.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990) (plurality opinion); then citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 
(1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.); then quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion); and then 
citing Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
36 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
37 Id. at 464–66. 
38 See id. at 470–71 (equating the government with private property owners). 
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doctrine should require the city to pass a resolution formally adopting the 
monument as its own and articulating what message it is trying to 
communicate.39 The Court reasoned that any formal adoption requirement 
“would be a pointless exercise” because placing the monument in the park 
is sufficient to put people on notice that it is endorsing it.40 Requiring a 
specific message, the Court contended, “fundamentally misunderstands the 
way monuments convey meaning.”41 
Scholars have criticized Summum for the Court’s failure to require 
more from the government before permitting it to receive the benefit of the 
government speech doctrine. As Helen Norton and others have argued, 
failing to require the government to be transparent about when it is 
speaking undermines the possibility of political accountability.42 Others 
have argued that this failure can potentially lead to the government “using 
the government speech doctrine as a cloak” for “misconduct.”43 
Summum set a very low bar for the application of the government 
speech doctrine. If the principles of that case are generally applicable to all 
cases where the government asserts a government speech doctrine defense, 
the government does not have to develop the message; the government 
does not have to formally adopt the message; the government does not even 
have to clearly say anything. All that Summum seems to require is that the 
government exercise final approval authority over expression on its 
property. Although the Court emphasized how different permanent 
monuments are from more temporary displays, the threat to the public 
39 Id. at 473–74. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 474. 
42 Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 587, 599 (2008) (“[T]he government can establish its entitlement to the government speech 
defense only when it establishes itself as the source of that expression both as a formal and as a 
functional matter.” (emphasis omitted)); see also, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 29, at 1510 
(“[G]overnment should be able to act as a speaker only when it does so purposefully, with an identified 
message, which is reasonably understood by those receiving it to be the government’s message.”); 
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 605, 615 (2008) (“[O]ne of the problems posed by mixed speech is the risk that the public will not 
spot government advocacy and will therefore fail to hold the government accountable for its 
viewpoint.”); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 
36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 57 (2002) (“[A]ccountability depends most fundamentally upon the 
government adequately informing the citizenry of the fact that it is speaking when it engages in a 
government/private speech interaction.”). 
43 Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the 
Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1302 (2010); see also Bezanson & Buss, 
supra note 29, at 1510–11 (“Without the limiting rules of purpose, message, and receipt, the 
government’s speech prerogative could permit the government after the fact to claim that any action is 
expressive, and subject to different criteria than those applied to instances of government regulation.”). 
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forum doctrine—and to the rest of the robust protections for free speech 
that the First Amendment otherwise usually provides—is obvious.44 
Of course, if one is not a fan of the public forum doctrine, this threat 
might not be much of a concern. It is possible to see this disdain for the 
public forum doctrine in Justice Breyer’s Summum concurrence. Justice 
Breyer—who went on to author the majority opinion in Walker—wrote 
separately in Summum to make clear he was uncomfortable with the 
“jurisprudence of labels” that the First Amendment had become.45 He 
argued that excluding Summum’s proffered monument “does not 
disproportionately restrict Summum’s freedom of expression” given the 
group’s ability to express itself in other ways, the “impracticality of 
alternatives,” and “the City’s legitimate needs” to “use park space to 
further a variety of recreational, historical, educational, esthetic, and other 
civic interests.”46 
As Justice Breyer’s Summum concurrence suggests, the Court has 
sometimes embraced the government speech doctrine to resolve tricky 
problems. Once the Court determines the case before it involves 
government speech, First Amendment claims dissolve like magic. In 
various cases, the Court has rejected the application of the public forum 
doctrine because it would lead to what the Court believes would be 
unworkable results.47 Indeed, the popular perception of Summum as an easy 
case may come not from the clarity of the Court’s reasoning but rather from 
an awareness of the implications of a contrary ruling.48 This kind of 
44 The Court has described a public park as a “quintessential” public forum. See, e.g., Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
45 Summum, 555 U.S. at 484 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 
720, 740–43 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
46 Id. at 484–85. Justice Breyer has recognized the usefulness of the government speech doctrine 
before. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 569 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Now 
that we have had an opportunity to consider the ‘government speech’ theory, I accept it as a solution to 
the problem presented by these cases.”). This is not inconsistent with Justice Breyer’s general 
willingness to jettison the First Amendment jurisprudence in favor of a case-by-case proportionality 
inquiry. 
47 See, e.g., Summum, 555 U.S. at 480; United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 
(2003) (plurality opinion) (finding forum analysis “incompatible with the discretion that public libraries 
must have to fulfill their traditional missions”). 
48 Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 915 
(2010) (declaring that Summum was an easy case for deciding government speech but also recognizing 
that “[p]erhaps Summum was unanimous because the objectionable consequences of a contrary ruling 
were so clear as a pragmatic matter”). Of course not everyone thinks Summum was decided correctly. 
See, e.g., Gey, supra note 43, at 1302 (criticizing Summum as “[s]loppy, and ultimately incoherent”). 
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pragmatism appears sometimes in the Court’s speech decisions,49 albeit 
inconsistently.50 
The government has not always prevailed when it has argued that it 
should be permitted to make viewpoint-based determinations about who 
can use its property—whether in the form of land or subsidy or some other 
benefit—to speak. In fact, attempts to expand or at least solidify the 
government speech doctrine have suffered two notable defeats in recent 
years. In Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open 
Society International, Inc., the Court declared that the government may not 
condition the receipt of subsidies unless those subsidies serve the purposes 
of the program.51 In that particular case, the Court held that conditioning 
the receipt of funds to fight HIV/AIDS on having an organizational policy 
against prostitution and sex trafficking was unconstitutional.52 The Court 
rejected Justice Scalia’s more expansive approach that would invalidate 
only those conditions that are coercive or not relevant to the contours of the 
federal program.53 The Court concluded it was “confident that the Policy 
Requirement [fell] on the unconstitutional side of the line” because it was 
not necessary to the program to require funding recipients to adopt a 
negative stance towards prostitution and sex trafficking.54 The Court also 
rejected the government’s argument that groups that did not honor the 
requirement would “undermine the government’s program and confuse its 
message opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”55 The Court admitted 
that the distinction “between conditions that define the federal program and 
those that reach outside it . . . is not always self-evident.”56 
In Lane v. Franks, the Court limited the scope of the government’s 
power to restrict the speech of its employees.57 In this case, a former 
government employee alleged he suffered retaliation for testifying at a 
49 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998) (explaining that 
the Court’s different treatment of designated public forums and nonpublic forums “encourage[s] the 
government to open its property to some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-
nothing choice, it might not open the property at all”). 
50 Norton & Citron, supra note 48, at 915–16. 
51 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330–32 (2013). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 2328. 
54 Id. at 2330–32. 
55 Id. at 2331–32 (quoting Brief for the Petitioners at 37, All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2321 (No. 12-10), 2013 WL 701226, at *37). 
56 Id. at 2330. Reconciling this decision with Rust, which forbade doctors from mentioning abortion 
at all to their patients, is not easy. 
57 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374–75 (2014). The Court explicitly did not address whether the First 
Amendment would protect an employee who testified as part of his job duties. Id. at 2378 n.4. 
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corruption trial.58 The Court held that the First Amendment protected the 
employee’s right to testify on a matter of public concern, even when the 
subject of his testimony involves information he learned during the course 
of his employment.59 Prior to Lane, the Court’s decision in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos had left unclear whether the First Amendment would protect 
public employees in such circumstances.60 
Strictly speaking, neither Open Society nor Lane directly provides 
guidance regarding how courts should choose between the public forum 
doctrine and the government speech doctrine. After all, one case concerns 
the constitutionality of government limits on subsidy programs, and the 
other concerns the constitutional rights of government employees; the 
public forum was inapposite to both. Nevertheless, because both cases 
rejected arguments in favor of the government speech doctrine, they 
potentially suggest that the doctrine should not apply when the speech 
restriction (or compulsion) does not serve a programmatic purpose, or at 
least when the government does not have a good reason for censoring or 
compelling private speech. 
B. License Plates
The power of states to control the messages that appear on license 
plates has been a hotly debated issue for decades. This debate first began in 
the context of determining whether the government could force car owners 
to post its own messages on their cars; more recently, the debate has 
focused on First Amendment challenges to the optional specialty and 
vanity license plates states offer for an additional fee. 
The debate over license plates began almost forty years ago in Wooley 
v. Maynard, where the Court held that individuals could not be compelled
to affix to their car a license plate proclaiming New Hampshire’s motto
“Live Free or Die.”61 Significantly, the Court did not address the state’s
argument that no one would believe car operators affirmed the motto
simply by affixing the plate to their vehicle because everyone knows that
the state prescribed the format and content of the required license plates.62
58 Id. at 2375–76. 
59 Id. at 2378. 
60 Garcetti held that the First Amendment does not restrict the government’s ability to control 
speech that “owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.” 547 U.S. 410, 
421–22 (2006). Lane made clear that “the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information 
acquired by virtue of his public employment does not transform that speech into employee—rather than 
citizen—speech.” 134 S. Ct. at 2379. 
61 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977). 
62 Id. at 720–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The issue, unconfronted by the Court, is whether 
appellees, in displaying, as they are required to do, state license tags, the format of which is known to 
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The Court did not consider whether the motto or anything else on a license 
plate constituted government speech because the Court had not yet 
recognized the government speech doctrine, and New Hampshire did not 
make any such argument. 
Indeed, customized license plates were not likely on the Court’s mind 
forty years ago because they were not in widespread existence at that point. 
Most states did not begin earning revenue from specialty license plates 
until the late 1980s, when the public sympathies for the Challenger 
explosion prompted the creation of a commemorative Challenger license 
plate.63 Since that time, specialty license plates have turned into big 
business.64 Texas’s program brings in millions of dollars each year.65 The 
precise contours of each state’s license plate program can vary, but the 
three programs Texas has are representative. In one Texas program, the 
state legislature itself has selected a limited number of mottos.66 A second 
Texas program permits private individuals and organizations to request 
specialty plates through a “state-designated private vendor,” typically for 
promotional or commercial purposes.67 These first two programs were not 
at issue in Walker. Instead, the Court was asked to consider the 
constitutionality of a program permitting the Board of the Texas 
Department of Motor Vehicles to “‘create new specialty license plates on 
its own initiative or on receipt of an application from a’ nonprofit entity 
seeking to sponsor a specialty plate.”68 Nonprofits must include “a draft 
design of the specialty license plate” in their application.69 The Board has 
been delegated authority to approve applications and is permitted to refuse 
to create a plate “if the design might be offensive to any member of the 
public . . . or for any other reason established by rule.”70 In Walker, the 
all as having been prescribed by the State, would be considered to be advocating political or ideological 
views.”). 
63 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The Example of 
Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2001). 
64 See id.; Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2261–62 
(2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that specialty license plate programs have been adopted by many 
states “because they bring in money”). 
65 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2261–62 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 2244 (describing Texas’s program and offering “Keep Texas Beautiful,” “Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving,” and “Fight Terrorism” as example plates (quoting TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 
§§ 504.602, 504.608, 504.647 (West 2013))).
67 See id. (first citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 504.6011(a); then citing § 504.851(a); and then
citing 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 217.52(b) (2015)) (offering “Keller Indians” and “Get it Sold with 
RE/MAX” as examples). These plates are approved by the Board of the Texas Department of Motor 
Vehicles. Id. 
68 Id. (quoting TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 504.801(a); and then citing § 504.801(b)). 
69 Id. (quoting 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 217.45(i)(2)(C)). 
70 Id. at 2244–45 (quoting TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 504.801(c)). 
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Board rejected a proposed plate design submitted by the Sons of 
Confederate Veterans because it contained a Confederate flag in its logo.71 
The Board rejected the plate as “offensive” because, it concluded, the 
public associates the flag “with organizations advocating expressions of 
hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning to those people or 
groups.”72 
Prior to Walker, courts and commentators had disagreed whether 
specialty license plate programs in various states constitute a “limited 
public forum,” “nonpublic forum,” government speech, or some form of 
“hybrid” public and private speech.73 Other moneymaking schemes, such as 
adopt-a-highway programs74 and sponsorship of public radio,75 had faced 
similar challenges and scrutiny. As this debate swirled, the Court continued 
its struggle, in fits and starts, to define the government speech doctrine. 
In the many license plate cases decided before Summum, lower courts 
frequently applied a four-factor test to determine what constitutes 
government speech: 
(1) the central purpose of the program in which the speech in question occurs;
(2) the degree of editorial control exercised by the government or private
entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the literal speaker;
71 Id. at 2243–44. 
72 Id. at 2245 (quoting Resolution Denying Sons of the Confederate Veterans Specialty License 
Plate Application, Joint Appendix at 64–65, Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (No. 14-144), 2014 WL 7498018, 
at *65). 
73 Courts have reached varying conclusions on categorizing specialty license plates. See, e.g., Ariz. 
Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 971 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding specialty license plates were a 
limited public forum); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 865 (7th Cir. 2008) (specialty 
license plates are a nonpublic forum); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 377–80 (6th Cir. 
2006) (holding forum analysis did not apply to specialty license plates because they constitute 
government speech); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1100, 1105 
(D. Md. 1997) (holding Maryland violated the First Amendment by refusing to issue license plates with 
a Confederate flag); Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F. Supp. 414, 417 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding ban on reference 
to deities on specialty license plates violates the First Amendment). Scholars similarly classify specialty 
license plates as government speech, private speech, or some combination of the two. See, e.g., Corbin, 
supra note 42, at 619 (“Messages on specialty license plates are a paradigmatic example of speech with 
both private and governmental speakers.”); Scott W. Gaylord, “Kill the Sea Turtles” and Other Things 
You Can’t Make the Government Say, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 94 (2014) (arguing that license 
plates are government speech because states exercise ultimate control over their content); Jacobs, supra 
note 63, at 423 (arguing “that specialty plate programs are private speech forums,” and noting that 
many such programs are unconstitutional). 
74 See, e.g., Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2004). 
75 See, e.g., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
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and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the ultimate 
responsibility for the content of the speech.76 
Courts generally did not offer a theoretical justification for why any or all 
of these factors were important,77 but over the course of time, some lower 
courts expressed the view that these factors could be summarized more 
simply as an inquiry into whether a reasonable observer would regard the 
expression as government speech.78 A marked minority of courts and 
commentators focused much less or not at all on what a reasonable 
observer would believe and claimed ultimate government control over the 
speech was the central concern of the doctrine.79 
Many lower courts held that state specialty license plate programs (or 
related vanity license plate programs) are most appropriately analyzed as 
limited public or nonpublic forums in which viewpoint-based distinctions 
are impermissible. Those concluding that a specialty license plate program 
creates a nonpublic forum have sometimes held that the government 
nevertheless has the power to make speech restrictions that are 
“reasonable” given the purpose of the forum. Specifically, some courts 
have held that states can exclude an entire subject area from specialty 
license plates, particularly when that subject area is controversial.80 The 
Seventh Circuit, for example, held that the Illinois specialty license plate 
program was a nonpublic forum, but “[t]o the extent that messages on 
76 Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792–93 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sons of 
Confederate Veterans v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)); 
see also Ariz. Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 964–65 (adopting the Fourth Circuit’s test in the license plate 
context). Many other circuits have relied on these factors in other speech contexts. See, e.g., Knights of 
the Ku Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1093–94 (public broadcasting); Wells v. City and Cty. of Denver, 
257 F.3d 1132, 1140–41 (10th Cir. 2001) (city holiday display). 
77 See Norton, supra note 42, at 598 (“While courts applying any or all of these factors have yet to 
identify their underlying theoretical justification, these considerations appear to reflect courts’ intuitive 
yet not-fully-articulated sense of the need to insist on a clearly governmental source to ensure that 
government can be held accountable for the speech it claims as its own.” (footnote omitted)). 
78 See, e.g., Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 338 (2d Cir.) (“Considering the 
emphasis on context and the public’s perception of the speaker’s identity in Summum, we think the 
proper inquiry here is ‘whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the 
expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech the government chooses to 
oblige.’” (quoting Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388, 394 (5th 
Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 
(2015))), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g in part, 611 F. App’x 741 (2d Cir. 2015); see 
also Norton & Citron, supra note 48, at 917 (noting that over time circuit courts came to “more 
helpfully explain [the four] factors as proxies for determining a reasonable onlooker’s attribution of the 
speech to the government or private parties”). 
79 See, e.g., ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375–77 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that 
government control is the central inquiry); Gaylord, supra note 73, at 126–32 (arguing that a 
government control standard is controlling after Summum and Johanns). 
80 See, e.g., Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 865–67 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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specialty license plates are regarded as approved by the State, it is 
reasonable for the State to maintain a position of neutrality on the subject 
of abortion.”81 Similarly, the Second Circuit held just one month before 
Walker that New York did not have to issue a “Choose Life” plate because 
such an issue is “so incredibly divisive.”82 
In Walker, the Court held that the specialty license plates were 
government speech and that the public forum doctrine was inapplicable.83 
Without even mentioning that scholars and courts had struggled to 
determine the correct approach for analyzing First Amendment challenges 
to specialty license plates, the majority declared that the following three 
factors were relevant: (1) the history of license plates; (2) the reasonable 
observer test; and (3) the government’s control over the content of license 
plates.84 As discussed in greater detail in Part II, the dissent disagreed with 
the Court’s analysis of all three of these factors and took issue with its 
failure to consider other relevant factors. 
Because the majority concluded that the Texas plates are government 
speech, it did not have to address Texas’s argument that its decision to 
reject a plate with a Confederate flag did not constitute viewpoint-based 
discrimination. The dissenters did, however, and rejected it out of hand. 
The dissenters first drew a parallel to an approved plate design, the Buffalo 
Soldiers plate, which was intended to honor soldiers.85 They argued that the 
SCV supporters also claimed their plate was intended to honor soldiers, and 
that it was inconsistent to approve one and reject the other.86 The dissenters 
81 Id. at 866. Relatedly, some courts have held states do not have to issue vanity license plates that 
are offensive, provided that the determination of offensiveness is viewpoint neutral. See, e.g., Perry v. 
McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding Vermont’s restriction on scatological terms on 
vanity plates as viewpoint neutral and reasonable). But see Montenegro v. N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 
93 A.3d 290, 298 (N.H. 2014) (finding the denial of “offensive” vanity plates unconstitutional under 
New Hampshire constitution). Arguably vanity plates are even more obviously private speech, given 
that they are unique vehicle identifiers an individual driver requests, rather than mass-produced license 
plates. See Norton, supra note 42, at 618–19 (noting that vanity license plates and the U.S. 
government’s “vanity stamp program” potentially implicate private speech because “the government 
can disavow formal authorship”). Since Walker, lower courts have addressed whether vanity plates are 
government speech, with mixed results. Compare Mitchell v. Md. Motor Vehicle Admin., 126 A.3d 
165, 184–88 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (holding vanity plates are not government speech), with 
Comm’r of the Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Vawter, 45 N.E.3d 1200, 1204–07 (Ind. 2015) 
(holding vanity plates are government speech). 
82 Fiala, 790 F.3d at 342, 352 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Deposition of Jill Dunn, Joint Appendix at 
1364, Fiala, 790 F.3d 328 (No. 11-5199)) (holding specialty license plate program created a nonpublic 
forum and that the decision to reject the “Choose Life” plate was viewpoint neutral). 
83 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251–53. 
84 Id. at 2251. 
85 Id. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. 
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also went on to reject Texas’s argument that its decision was constitutional 
because the SCV plate was rejected not because of its message but because 
the Board was worried about driver distraction or road rage that could 
undermine safety.87 They pointed out that Texas had failed to present any 
evidence to support this claim, and that it had failed to ban Confederate 
flag bumper stickers.88 
II. A CLOSE LOOK AT WALKER
In Walker, Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, candidly uses the 
government speech doctrine as a convenient solution for what he regards as 
an otherwise tricky problem. Although it appears that Justice Breyer’s 
approach is not far different from the proportionality or balancing approach 
he has advocated in a number of cases,89 his majority opinion in Walker 
announces what appears to be a new three-part test for government speech. 
Determining whether private speech is actually government speech requires 
an inquiry into three factors: (1) the history of the program at issue; (2) the 
understanding of a reasonable person; and (3) whether the government has 
ultimate control over the content of the speech. This test contains various 
elements the Court had mentioned before in its First Amendment cases, but 
the Court had never used them all together as a way of defining 
87 Id. at 2263. 
88 Id. Arguments about the need to censor controversial political speech have been made in public 
transit advertising cases. See, e.g., Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 
499–503 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that public transit advertising constituted a limited public forum and 
the rejection of a controversial political advertisement about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was 
reasonable and viewpoint neutral because the government made a reasonable forecast of substantial 
disruption and rejected all advertisements on either side of that topic). In Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. 
Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F. Supp. 3d 572 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 109 F. Supp. 3d 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), 
Judge Koeltl rejected claims that accepting a controversial political advertisement would lead to 
violence, stating, “the defendants underestimate the tolerant quality of New Yorkers and overestimate 
the potential impact of these fleeting advertisements.” Id. at 583. 
89 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The 
First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives 
and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories . . . .”); District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that he would adopt “an 
interest-balancing inquiry” for assessing gun regulations); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal 
judgment.”); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388–89 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s strict application of the commercial speech doctrine and arguing that “the 
Constitution demands a more lenient application, an application that reflects the need for distinctions 
among contexts, forms of regulation, and forms of speech”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 
377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining that when “a law significantly implicates 
competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways,” the Court should consider whether the 
burden of the law is proportional to the government interest). 
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government speech. Each prong of the test is deeply problematic, 
particularly in the way in which the Court applied them in Walker. 
A. History
In Summum, the Court relied on the longstanding historical tradition of 
governments using monuments to communicate, whether the government 
has commissioned and financed the construction of those monuments or 
accepted monuments donated by private groups.90 In Walker, the majority 
contends that history similarly indicates that states are speaking through 
license plates because they have long used license plates not just to identify 
vehicles but also to communicate messages.91 
Before criticizing the majority’s warped view of the history of 
messaging on license plates, it is worth noting how interesting it is that the 
four progressive Justices on the Court rely on history for the interpretation 
of the scope of First Amendment rights. Although history has lately played 
a more central role in the Court’s jurisprudence in cases like United States 
v. Stevens and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court’s
reliance on history in those cases is hardly free from controversy.92 If the
Court consistently relied on history, it would be forced to roll back
protections it has extended for all sorts of speech that were traditionally
unprotected (or at least not clearly protected), and perhaps extend
protections to speech that the Court has excluded, such as obscenity. In
addition, the “liberal” wing of the Court has generally rejected arguments
that history and tradition should be used to define what is a public forum.93
Certainly the explicit consideration of history could be useful in 
defining government speech, but such an inquiry is troublesome in many 
ways. Locating the relevant historical tradition is often difficult.94 The 
90 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2009). 
91 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248 (“States have used license plate slogans to urge action, to promote 
tourism, and to tout local industries.”). 
92 See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 398–401 (2014) 
(criticizing the historical framework advanced in Stevens). 
93 See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 694–95 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments) (arguing that history and tradition should not be 
determinative factors for deciding what constitutes a public forum because asking whether the public 
property is one that has had as “‘a principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas’ . . . leaves the 
government with almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property” (internal citations 
omitted)).  
94 The Justices frequently debate history in constitutional law cases, and increasingly history is 
playing an important role in First Amendment speech cases as well. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–47 (2012) (plurality opinion) (finding no historical basis for excluding false 
speech from First Amendment protection); id. at 2557–63 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing a history of 
protecting military honors and punishing false speech); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 
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history of government regulation of a forum is most useful to prevent the 
government from taking over a forum that has been traditionally open to a 
variety of viewpoints—like streets, parks, and sidewalks. In addition, when 
the government deviates from a long history of permissiveness to restrict a 
certain viewpoint, a historical inquiry can suggest the true motivation for 
the restriction is hostility to that speech, rather than an intent to use the 
forum to promote a government message.95 It is unclear, however, how this 
historical inquiry would function in cases involving new communications 
platforms, like social media. A lack of history could undermine perfectly 
legitimate government efforts to control communications in new forums.96 
On the other hand, the inability of plaintiffs to point to a history of 
openness in these new communications forums would potentially give the 
government a free pass to engage in viewpoint-based discrimination.97 
Justice Breyer’s historical analysis demonstrates how easily history 
can be manipulated to support a finding of government speech. Justice 
Breyer concludes that “the history of license plates shows that . . . they long 
have communicated messages from the States.”98 Justice Breyer fails to 
recognize the rise of specialty license plates as distinct from the issuance of 
the first license plate in the early 1900s and the inclusion of state symbols 
and mottos several years later. Of course license plates are used for 
identification, and of course states have used license plates to express state 
pride, but specialty license plates did not become popular until the late 
2729, 2736 n.3 (2011) (finding that historical traditions did not support an exception for violent speech 
directed at minors); id. at 2759 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing historical evidence demonstrates that 
the First Amendment does not protect “a right to speak to children without going through their 
parents”). 
95 Cf. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (noting that 
a historical inquiry can help reveal invidious discriminatory purpose). 
96 See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 
44 SETON HALL L. REV. 395, 424–25 (2014) (“[The] historical prerequisite would preclude the 
government from attempting to assert control over existing mediums of communication to immunize 
itself from compliance with First Amendment limitations.”). In one post-Walker case, Mech v. School 
Board of Palm Beach County, 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit struggled with this 
historical inquiry and ultimately concluded that “[t]he absence of historical evidence can be overcome 
by other indicia of government speech.” Id. at 1075–76. For example, the court explained, “if the 
School Board posted a message about school closings for inclement weather on Facebook or Twitter, 
we would have little difficulty classifying the message as government speech, even though social media 
is a relatively new phenomenon.” Id. at 1076. 
97 Rhodes, supra note 96, at 427–28 (explaining that, under the historical approach, the government 
can assert tremendous control over new “avenue[s] of communication”). Justice Breyer has not 
frequently embroiled himself in historical debates before, with the notable exception of District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 683–87 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
98 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 (2015) (citing 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)). 
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1980s, when Florida issued a special commemorative Challenger plate.99 It 
was not until the 1990s that Texas realized the moneymaking value of 
license plates and began to issue specialty plates with a small variety of 
slogans with messages the state has selected.100 It is not appropriate to 
equate the history of license plates generally with the much more recent 
history of specialty plates. 
The majority’s reliance on history to determine what constitutes 
government speech is strikingly familiar to the approach it has embraced 
when determining whether to recognize a new category of unprotected 
speech. In Stevens, for example, the Court rejected the argument that new 
exceptions to the First Amendment could be created based on a balancing 
of the benefits and harms of a particular kind of speech;101 instead, Chief 
Justice Roberts declared, categorical exceptions must be “historic and 
traditional.”102 This assertion helped the Court resolve the animal cruelty 
case, but it fails to explain all of the various existing categories of speech 
that now receive full or at least partial constitutional protection without 
even a hint of historic support. As it did in Stevens, the Court in Walker 
places great weight on a historical inquiry “without adequately considering 
the wider, logical, and normative implications of doing [so].”103 Because 
Walker’s historical analysis is so suspect, it is difficult to know how lower 
courts are supposed to apply it in the future. 
B. The Reasonable Observer
In Walker, the Court makes clear for the first time that the reasonable 
observer test plays an important role in determining what constitutes 
government speech. In the face of jeers from the dissent,104 the majority 
proclaims that a reasonable observer would associate any speech on a 
specialty license plate with the state.105 The Court explains that the 
reasonable observer would know that license plates are government 
property even when they are affixed to private vehicles because the 
government maintains tight control over what can appear on these plates, 
99 Jacobs, supra note 63, at 424. 
100 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2257 (Alito, J., dissenting) (summarizing the history of specialty 
plates in Texas). 
101 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2010). 
102 Id. at 468 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991)). 
103 See Massaro, supra note 92, at 400 (discussing the reliance on history in Stevens). 
104 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If a car with a plate that says ‘Rather Be 
Golfing’ passed by at 8:30 am on a Monday morning, would you think: ‘This is the official policy of 
the State—better to golf than to work?’”). 
105 See id. at 2249 (majority opinion). 
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and people pay extra money for specialty plates specifically because they 
want the government’s endorsement.106 All of these assumptions are 
questionable. 
The Court’s decision to embrace a reasonable observer test explicitly 
is noteworthy. The perception of a reasonable observer played a relatively 
small and uncertain role in Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Summum. In 
that case, the Court’s primary emphasis was on the long historical tradition 
of governments “us[ing] monuments to speak to the public.”107 Justice Alito 
also recognized, however, the common understanding that property owners 
do not open up their land for the erection of monuments conveying 
messages with which they disagree.108 Accordingly, Justice Alito wrote, 
“persons who observe donated monuments routinely—and reasonably—
interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner’s 
behalf,” regardless of whether a “monument is located on private property 
or on public property.”109 Justice Alito’s opinion left open whether he 
would embrace a reasonable observer test in all government speech cases 
or simply in contexts that involve the traditional rights of property 
owners.110 
It was Justice Souter who argued in his solo concurrence in Summum 
that the reasonable observer inquiry should play a primary role in 
determining what constitutes government speech.111 Justice Souter argued 
the reasonable observer test is appropriate because it is the same test used 
in Establishment Clause cases.112 The reasonable observer approach also 
106 See id. at 2248–49. 
107 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). 
108 Id. at 471. 
109 Id. 
110 Justice Alito also mentioned the reasonable observer in response to the argument that the 
government must have an articulable message whenever it speaks. He asserted that it was not 
uncommon for reasonable observers to disagree about the message the government wishes to express 
through permanent monuments. Id. at 474 (“[M]onument[s] may be intended to be interpreted, and may 
in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways.”); id. at 474–75 (noting that certain 
monuments, like the John Lennon “Imagine” monument in Central Park, “are almost certain to evoke 
different thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different observers”). 
111 Id. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to 
ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the expression to be 
government speech, as distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige by allowing the 
monument to be placed on public land.”); see also Gaylord, supra note 73, at 125 (“[A] majority of the 
Court has never adopted Justice Souter’s proposed [reasonable observer] test.”). 
112 Summum, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Cty. of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment)). Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Alito’s assertion that the reasonable 
observer would almost always associate a permanent monument on government property with the 
government. Id. at 481–82 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. 
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appeared in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, where the Court 
permitted a public school to censor speech that “students, parents, and 
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of 
the school.”113 As mentioned earlier, however, the Court has not (yet) 
explicitly recognized that case as a government speech case. 
Under the Establishment Clause’s reasonable observer test, the Court 
inquires whether reasonable observers would perceive the government to 
be endorsing religious expression or otherwise “appearing to take a 
position on questions of religious belief.”114 The Court has explained that 
the perception that the government endorses religious speech gives rise to 
an Establishment Clause violation because “it sends the ancillary message 
to members of the audience who are [nonadherents] ‘that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to [adherents] that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.’”115 In the government speech 
context, the reasonable observer test ideally ensures that the voting public 
knows that the government is speaking so that political accountability can 
occur. 
Determining exactly who this reasonable observer is and what this 
person knows, however, is famously controversial.116 In Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, the Court considered whether it was 
unconstitutional for a city to prevent the Ku Klux Klan from erecting a 
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 801–02 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (taking the same approach). Justice
Stevens suggested, however, that it might be more accurate to characterize the government’s acceptance
of the monument as “an implicit endorsement of the donor’s message.” Summum, 555 U.S. at 481
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
113 484 U.S. 260, 271–73 (1988). 
114 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594, 620. A reasonable observer inquiry is also used in other areas of the 
law, including trademark and copyright infringement. Determining what this reasonable ordinary 
observer knows or understands is not always easy. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The 
Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1258–60 (2014) (discussing 
how difficult it can be for juries to put themselves in the position of “actual consumers” to determine 
whether they would be confused between the defendant’s and plaintiff’s products); see id. at 1273 
(“Copyright law’s use of varied infringement audiences is confused and often depends on the particular 
circuit deciding the case.”). In addition, at least one study has demonstrated that in most trademark 
infringement cases, other factors—such as the proximity of goods, similarity of marks, and the 
defendant’s intent—play a larger role than actual consumer confusion in determining whether there is 
trademark infringement. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1600 (2006). 
115 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–10 (2000) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
116 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court and 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 533–37 (1986); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and 
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 
291–95 (1987). 
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large cross in a public square in front of the statehouse.117 In her 
concurrence, Justice O’Connor described the reasonable observer as “a 
hypothetical observer who is presumed to possess a certain level of 
information that all citizens might not share.”118 This person “must be 
deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in 
which the religious display appears,” as well as “the general history of the 
place in which the cross is displayed.”119 According to Justice O’Connor, 
this bar is not too high, as any “informed member of the community will 
know how the public space in question has been used in the past.”120 In 
dissent, Justice Stevens criticized Justice O’Connor’s approach for 
imagining “a well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law model.”121 
Instead, Justice Stevens would consider the perspective of a reasonable 
person passing by the monument.122 More recently, the Court has leaned 
towards Justice O’Connor’s view. In McCreary County v. ACLU of 
Kentucky, the Court stated that the reasonable observer is familiar with 
context and history; he is not “an absentminded objective observer.”123 
One puzzle of the reasonable observer inquiry is whether that 
reasonable observer knows the true legislative purpose behind the 
challenged government action.124 If the reasonable observer is “familiar 
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute under 
review,” then it would seem to follow that this reasonable observer 
understands the actual purpose of the challenged law (to the extent the 
actual purpose can be determined).125 In Walker, the Court gives no weight 
to the purpose of the specialty license plate program. Justice Alito, in his 
dissent, points out that the majority ignores the plain fact that the Board of 
the Texas DMV had itself declared that the program was intended “‘to 
encourage private plates’ in order to ‘generate additional revenue for the 
state.’”126 Of course courts have a “duty . . . to ‘distinguis[h] a sham secular 
117 515 U.S. 753, 757–60 (1995). 
118 Id. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
119 Id. at 780–81. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
122 Id. at 799–800, 800 n.5. 
123 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005). 
124 See Smith, supra note 116, at 293–94. 
125 Id. 
126 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2260 (2015) (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Resolution Denying Sons of the Confederate Veterans Specialty License Plate 
Application, Joint Appendix at 58, Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (No. 14-144), 2014 WL 7498018, at *58). 
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purpose from a sincere one,’”127 and at times this inquiry can be difficult, 
but it cannot be disputed that the government’s purpose for specialty 
license plates in Walker was to make money from the creation of a new 
expressive forum. 
Because it is not clear who the reasonable observer is and precisely 
what background knowledge she might have, this test leads to uncertainty 
and unpredictability.128 Indeed, prior to Walker, no fewer than six circuit 
courts held that the reasonable observer viewing specialty license plates 
would not consider the plates to be government speech.129 These courts 
explained that a reasonable observer would know that the purpose of the 
specialty program is to raise money; that individuals and groups are 
permitted to propose a wide variety of plates; that drivers can choose 
whether to have one of the approved specialty license plates on their 
vehicles; and that it is unlikely that the state is attempting to communicate 
all the hundreds of messages offered on these plates.130 
Notably, the only circuit court decision to hold that specialty license 
plates are government speech focused less on a reasonable observer inquiry 
and more on the government’s control of the speech.131 Indeed, even Texas 
did not advance a reasonable observer argument before the Court, relying 
127 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
128 Justice Breyer is well known for reaching different results in two cases that both involved the 
Ten Commandments on government property. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701–05 
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding that a Ten Commandments display on Texas 
State Capitol grounds did not violate the Establishment Clause), with McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851, 857–
58 (finding that a Ten Commandments display posted in courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, 
in opinion joined by Justice Breyer). 
129 See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e now join the Fourth, 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits in concluding that a reasonable and fully informed observer would consider 
the speaker to be the organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays the specialty 
license plate.”); Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388, 394 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (“Here, the differences between permanent monuments in public parks and specialty license 
plates on the back of personal vehicles convince us that a reasonable observer would understand that the 
specialty license plates are private speech.”), rev’d sub nom. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015); Children’s First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 338 (2d 
Cir.) (“[W]e have little difficulty concluding that such an observer would know that motorists 
affirmatively request specialty plates and choose to display those plates on their vehicles, which 
constitute private property.”), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g in part, 611 F. App’x 741 
(2d Cir. 2015). But see ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 377 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he medium 
in this case, a government-issued license plate that every reasonable person knows to be government-
issued, a fortiori conveys a government message.”). 
130 See Gaylord, supra note 73, at 118. 
131 See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375–76 (emphasizing government control over specialty license 
plates). 
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instead on the government’s exercise of final editorial control.132 It is quite 
possible that Texas did not advance a reasonable observer argument 
because it did not think it could win it. 
One reason the Walker Court gives for its conclusion that a reasonable 
observer would believe the license plates contain government speech is that 
each license plate is “a government article” (i.e., government property) 
which the government owns and controls.133 As an empirical matter, it is far 
from clear that this is correct. Although everyone knows the government 
issues license plates, many people do not realize that license plates remain 
government property even when they are affixed to a private vehicle. It is 
hard to say that this is an unreasonable misunderstanding. 
Even if the reasonable observer would know that license plates are 
government property, it does not follow that they would assume that 
everything on license plates is the government’s expression. The Walker 
Court declares that Texas uses the plates for identification purposes, and 
because Texas owns the plates and controls everything that appears on 
them, observers “routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying 
some message on the [government’s] behalf.”134 The Court appears to 
embrace what was only a suggestion in Summum—that the government’s 
mere ownership of property has expressive value that would be obvious to 
the reasonable observer. The Court’s willingness to accept this argument 
potentially turns the public forum doctrine on its head. As mentioned in 
Part I, the public forum doctrine rejected the traditional assumption that the 
government had the same property rights as private property owners to 
control the speech appearing on their property. The appearance of private 
speech on public property cannot be sufficient to convert that speech into 
government speech without eviscerating the public forum doctrine entirely. 
Another leap of logic Justice Breyer makes without evidentiary 
support is his suggestion that “a person who displays a message on a Texas 
license plate likely intends to convey to the public that the State has 
endorsed that message.”135 Although other courts and commentators have 
made this same assertion,136 it is not clear this is true.137 Most specialty 
132 See Vandergriff, 759 F.3d at 393 (“The Board . . . argues that speech is government speech 
when it is under the government’s ‘effective control.’”). 
133 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248. 
134 Id. at 2248–49 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009)). 
135 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. 
136 See, e.g., Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 13 P.3d 531, 541 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 
2000) (en banc) (Wollheim, J., concurring) (“[T]he license plate bears the imprimatur of the state. 
Petitioner wants the state’s endorsement of his message. . . . [A] bumper sticker would not satisfy 
petitioner’s desire to have the state endorse the words he chooses to display.”), aff’d, 72 P.3d 628 (Or. 
2003); see also Norton, supra note 42, at 620 (arguing that those who use specialty license plates 
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license plate schemes give the organization requesting the creation of a 
specialty plate a portion of the proceeds of the plate.138 Those who purchase 
the plate can express their support in an aesthetically pleasing manner. 
Bumper stickers are nowhere near as prevalent on cars anymore, perhaps 
because state specialty license plate programs have made it unnecessary to 
clutter up one’s car with bumper stickers and endure the risk of damage to 
the car’s paint. It is hardly clear that people who are willing to pay extra for 
such plates do so because they enjoy the state endorsement of their 
message. It is even less clear what assumptions the reasonable observer 
would make about why a car owner chooses a specialty license plate rather 
than a bumper sticker. 
Justice Alito brilliantly attacks the majority’s assumptions about the 
reasonable observer in his uncharacteristically clever dissent, where he asks 
rhetorically whether a reasonable observer who sees a specialty plate for 
another state’s university believes that his state is endorsing a rival.139 A 
perception of endorsement might be triggered only when she sees 
“offensive” speech on a specialty plate. Perhaps what is really going on in 
this case, then, is that some people who see a controversial message on a 
license plate might wonder, “Wow! I cannot believe Texas allows 
Confederate flags on its license plates.” The more controversial the 
message, the more likely people will wonder why a state was permitting 
that message to appear. 
In the Establishment Clause context, it is unclear whether the mythical 
reasonable observer “will have the perspective of one in the religious 
majority or religious minority, and whether the observer will have the 
perspective of an adherent or a nonadherent of the religion on display.”140 
The same could be said of the reasonable observer asked to evaluate 
whether a particular message is government or private speech. Just as 
members of a religious majority are less likely to regard the presence of 
common religious symbols in public places as an endorsement of religion, 
individuals who embrace majoritarian views are less likely to regard 
noncontroversial expression on public property as containing a government 
instead of license plate frames or bumper stickers might “intend, and may be likely to achieve, the 
public’s perception that the government endorses their views”). 
137 See Jacobs, supra note 63, at 424–25 (“Groups that seek specialty plates are generally motivated 
by both their money-making potential and the recognition that they bring to the advertised cause. . . . 
Similarly, individuals who buy the plates do so both to help fund the identified organization or cause, 
and to publicly express their ideological support for it.”).  
138 Id. 
139 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
140 Benjamin I. Sachs, Whose Reasonableness Counts?, 107 YALE L. J. 1523, 1526 (1998). 
110:1195 (2016) Government Brand 
1219 
endorsement and are more likely to regard controversial or offensive 
speech as carrying the government’s imprimatur.141 
The Court offers no meaningful guidance for determining when 
observers reasonably attribute private expression to the government. 
Walker suggests that such conclusions are reasonable whenever speech 
appears on government property, but this cannot be correct. In several other 
cases, the Court has recognized that it is not always reasonable to attribute 
speech to a property owner, at least when the property owner is legally 
compelled to permit the speech.142 In Walker, the Court does not even 
attempt to distinguish its prior compelled speech and association cases.143 
Arguably, a ruling against Texas in Walker would have demonstrated that 
states are legally compelled to provide equal access to its specialty license 
plate program. If Texas remained concerned that the public will not know 
about this constitutional requirement and would mistakenly continue to 
misattribute private speakers’ messages to Texas, the state could engage in 
a clarifying public relations campaign.144 
Putting aside all the foregoing criticisms regarding the Court’s 
application of the reasonable observer test in Walker, a fundamental 
question remains: Is it either appropriate or necessary to use the same test 
to determine what constitutes government speech and what constitutes a 
141 See Marshall, supra note 116, at 533 (“[T]he meaning of a symbol depends on the nature of its 
audience.” (citing Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 84–85 
(1985)). 
142 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65, 70 (2006) 
(dismissing First Amendment challenge to Solomon Amendment, explaining that even high school 
students (and certainly law students) “can appreciate the difference between speech a school sponsors 
and speech the school permits because [it is] legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access 
policy” (first citing Bd. of Ed. of Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) 
(plurality opinion); then citing Mergens, 496 U.S. at 268 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); and 
then citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995)); Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653–55 (1994) (rejecting cable providers’ arguments that must-carry 
provisions amount to compelled speech in part because “[g]iven cable’s long history of serving as a 
conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would assume that the 
broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator”); 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 85–88 (1980) (rejecting compelled speech claim 
made by a California shopping mall that treated it like a public forum under the state constitution 
because the views of speakers at malls “will not likely be identified with those of the owner”). The 
Court’s jurisprudence on compelled speech and the right of association is not a model of clarity. See 
Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833, 833–44 (2010) (observing that sometimes 
the Court’s focus in compelled speech and association cases is the danger that the public will 
misattribute another’s message to an individual or group, but in other cases misattribution is not the 
Court’s primary concern). Walker does nothing to help cure this confusion. 
143 It is particularly strange that the Court ignored its compelled speech cases given that Texas’s 
argument essentially is that it cannot be “compelled” to speak through its specialty license plate 
program. 
144 See Greene, supra note 142, at 850. 
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violation of the Establishment Clause? In the context of the government 
speech analysis, a reasonable observer’s mistaken perception that the 
government endorses speech harms only the government’s interests in 
distancing itself from messages it does not like. It does not undermine 
anyone’s civil liberties; indeed, if anything, this expansion of the 
government speech doctrine threatens only the First Amendment rights of 
speakers who cannot express their messages on specialty license plates.145 
The expansion of the government speech doctrine to protect the 
government’s interests in misattribution threatens to pervert the 
marketplace of ideas by allowing the government to prefer some speech 
over others. 
Justice Thomas’s decision to join Justice Breyer’s opinion to form a 
majority is noteworthy, and not just because this particular lineup is 
extraordinarily rare. Some commentators have suggested that Justice 
Thomas’s vote is based solely on the fact that he shares the liberal’s 
distaste for the Confederate flag.146 Because he did not write separately, it is 
hard to know what was behind his vote in this case.147 Given that Justice 
Thomas has vehemently rejected the reasonable observer test in 
Establishment Clause cases,148 it is a bit of a mystery why he would 
embrace such an inquiry in government speech cases. 
145 It is worth emphasizing again that the decision in Walker was not based on the notion that the 
government has an interest in avoiding the appearance that it endorses hate speech specifically. See 
supra Introduction. 
146 Eugene Volokh and Erwin Chemerinsky disagree on this point. Compare Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Troubling Government Speech Doctrine, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (June 19, 2015), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-troubling-government-speech-doctrine [perma.cc/4GPZ-BZU5] 
(suggesting Justice Thomas joined the majority because Confederate flags communicate an inherently 
hurtful message), with Eugene Volokh, Justice Thomas’s Vote in Walker v. Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, WASH. POST. (June 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2015/06/24/justice-thomass-vote-in-walker-v-sons-of-confederate-veterans/ [perma.cc/J6PL-5VNZ] 
(arguing that Justice Thomas was not motivated by an inherent disdain for the Confederate flag, as he 
has protected racist speech in the past). Justice Thomas’s subsequent dissent from the Court’s denial of 
a petition for writ of certiorari in a case involving a challenge to a public transit advertising policy, 
where he expressed concern about “problematic content-based restrictions,” Am. Freedom Def. 
Initiative v. King Cty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1025 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari), makes it only more unclear why he joined the Walker majority. 
147 In Virginia v. Black, for example, Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion explaining at great 
length the history and inherently threatening nature of cross burning. 538 U.S. 343, 388–94 (2003) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  
148 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1838 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]here is no support for the proposition that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment embraced wholly modern notions that the Establishment Clause is violated 
whenever the ‘reasonable observer’ feels ‘subtle pressure,’ or perceives governmental 
‘endors[ement].’” (citations omitted)). 
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C. Control
The third factor on which Justice Breyer rests his majority opinion in 
Walker is Texas’s exercise of “final approval authority” over the messages 
displayed on specialty plates.149 A control element has appeared elsewhere 
in the Court’s government speech cases, but the control required here is 
very minimal. 
Standing alone, it is hard to imagine the Court ever holding that the 
state’s exercise of ultimate control over the content of speech is sufficient 
for a finding of government speech. The government cannot claim 
immunity from First Amendment scrutiny for speech in a traditional public 
forum, for example, by demonstrating pre-speech review. Indeed, any such 
scheme would be a prior restraint, and prior restraints are presumptively 
unconstitutional.150 Furthermore, a “control test” for government speech 
“could incentivize the government to increase its control over speech, 
thereby deem the speech its own, and then use its freedom from First 
Amendment constraints to discriminate against disfavored speakers and 
messages at will.”151 
Control plays a central role in the Court’s decisions in Johanns and 
Summum. In Johanns, the Court found that promotional beef ads 
constituted government speech.152 There, the challengers argued that the 
federal government could not claim the protections of the government 
speech doctrine because third-party nongovernmental actors were involved 
in creating the content.153 The Court rejected this argument because the 
federal government “effectively control[s]” the message because it “sets the 
overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is 
disseminated.”154 It certainly makes sense to consider whether the 
government has established a particular program or platform for speech 
with the goal of communicating a particular message. It also makes sense 
that sometimes it will still be appropriate to conclude that the government 
is speaking when members of the public contribute content. But when the 
element of government control exists solely in the form of censoring 
speech pursuant to a vague and unprincipled “offensiveness” standard, the 
ugly specter of viewpoint discrimination is unavoidable. 
149 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249 (2015) (quoting 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473 (2009)). 
150 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). 
151 ACLU of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
152 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 556–62 (2005). 
153 Id. at 560. 
154 Id. at 560–62. 
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Furthermore, Walker’s application of the control inquiry was troubling 
because Texas did not in fact exercise meaningful control over messages 
appearing on specialty license plates. Although Texas mentioned in its 
reply brief that it had rejected a handful of other specialty license plate 
applications,155 the dissent points out that the precise details of these 
rejections remain unclear.156 The Court noted  that Texas’s exercise of 
control informs the reasonable observer’s understanding that license plates 
are government speech,157 but given that Texas itself seemed unclear about 
when and under what circumstances it exercised this control,158 it is 
impossible to believe third parties knew about it. The lack of selectivity 
should impact not only whether a reasonable observer believes the 
government is speaking but also the likelihood of meaningful government 
accountability. Because the actual operation of the Texas license plate 
program demonstrates that Texas will create specialty license plates for 
almost anyone who asks, the likelihood of the public understanding that 
some plates are rejected—much less the criteria for the Board’s 
decisions—is slim. 
D. Factors Discounted or Not Considered
In Walker, Justice Breyer conducts a proportionality inquiry in the 
guise of a three-part test.159 He asserts that his opinion is just an application 
of the approach to the government speech doctrine in Summum,160 but it is 
clear he is picking and choosing what factors from that case are relevant to 
him here.161 
155 Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 9–10, Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) (No. 14-144), 2015 WL 
1088969, at *9–10. 
156 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
157 Id. at 2248–49 (majority opinion). 
158 Id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
159 Id. at 2247 (majority opinion). Justice Breyer is not always transparent about his desire to 
abandon the Court’s traditional doctrinal approaches. In Entertainment Merchants, for example, he 
asserted that it was appropriate to apply strict scrutiny, but stated he would not apply such scrutiny 
“mechanically.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S Ct. 2729, 2765 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 841 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). In 
Alvarez, he purported to apply a form of intermediate scrutiny but focused on a proportionality 
approach that “examine[s] speech-related harms, justifications, and potential alternatives.” United 
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551–52 (2012) (plurality opinion) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment). According to Justice Breyer, this approach “take[s] account of the seriousness of the speech-
related harm the provision will likely cause, the nature and importance of the provision’s countervailing 
objectives, the extent to which the provision will tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there are 
other, less restrictive ways of doing so.” Id. at 2251. 
160 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248. 
161 Indeed, Justice Breyer indirectly recognizes as much at the beginning of Walker, where he 
summarizes the result in Summum as resting on three factors: the history of public monuments, the 
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In his Walker dissent, Justice Alito points out some of the factors the 
majority largely ignores or discounts. For example, Justice Alito argues 
that the majority fails to address the differences between the rejection of 
the monument in Summum and the rejection of the SCV specialty license 
plate application. Justice Alito protests that public parks have never “been 
thrown open for private groups or individuals to put up whatever 
monuments they desired.”162 In addition, in Summum the spatial limitations 
of public parks rendered the application of the public forum doctrine 
unworkable; there are no such practical spatial problems present in the 
context of specialty license plates because the government can issue an 
unlimited number of plates.163 
The Walker majority suggests the public forum doctrine is unworkable 
in the context of specialty license plates because Texas would have to 
accept license plates not just with Confederate flags but other unappealing 
messages, like one supporting al Qaeda,164 and Texas would likely rather 
stop the program than do that. To be fair, Summum gave mixed messages 
on this sort of unworkability inquiry. Near the end of his majority opinion 
in that case, Justice Alito essentially makes a confession that “[t]he obvious 
truth of the matter is that if” the Court decided that the government had to 
accept permanent monuments on a viewpoint-neutral basis, “most parks 
would have little choice but to refuse all such donations.”165 It is not 
unreasonable to read this portion of the opinion as suggesting that a forum 
analysis does not apply whenever the government would rather close a 
forum than be forced to endorse offensive messages. This is the reading 
Justice Breyer appears to embrace in Walker. 
Another possibility, however, is that in Summum the Court was simply 
recognizing that as a practical matter, parks cannot accommodate many 
permanent monuments, and as a result, the government must be able to 
make some choices. By rejecting this approach to the “unworkability” 
inquiry, Walker suggests a wide variety of government platforms for 
expression will constitute government speech because in many instances 
the government would prefer to close them than embrace a diversity of 
viewpoints. Notably, the majority also fails to consider the possibility of 
content-neutral alternatives that might solve this alleged unworkability 
understanding of reasonable observers, and the city’s control over the monuments. Id. at 2247. He then 
states that “[i]n light of these and a few other relevant considerations, the Court concluded that the 
expression at issue was government speech.” Id. (emphasis added). 
162 Id. at 2259 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
163 See id. at 2259–61.  
164 Id. at 2249 (majority opinion). 
165 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009). 
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problem.166 This is particularly striking given the lengthy discussion of 
alternatives in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, which the Court decided on the 
very same day as Walker.167 
Justice Alito also criticizes the majority for largely discounting the 
for-profit nature of the specialty license plate program. Unlike any other 
government speech case before Walker, the Texas specialty plate program 
requires people to pay the state for the privilege of displaying one of these 
plates on their cars.168 Justice Alito notes that the fees Texas collects for 
specialty license plates far exceed the cost of their issuance.169 Justice 
Breyer responds that “the existence of government profit alone is 
insufficient to trigger forum analysis,” noting that the existence of 
maintenance fees would not have changed the outcome in Summum.170 This 
might well be correct, but it ignores the host of other factors that were 
crucial to the outcome in Summum (namely, the long tradition of permanent 
government monuments and the unworkability of the public forum doctrine 
in that context). Furthermore, this argument ignores the real possibility that 
the spending of government funds and resources to support third-party 
expressive activities is more likely to attract political attention and promote 
the sort of accountability that is at the heart of the government speech 
determination. 
Another problem with the government speech doctrine after Summum 
and Walker is that the government is not required to articulate any 
particular message. The Court first expressly rejected any such requirement 
in Summum, where Justice Alito waxed eloquently for the Court about how 
the meaning of public monuments is potentially different for each observer 
and changes over time.171 Although it may not be possible to declare 
definitively what message a permanent government monument is intended 
to express, the wide variety of the over 400 Texas specialty license plates 
indicates that the government has no message at all.172 
166 In ACLU of North Carolina v. Tata, the Fourth Circuit called North Carolina’s similar 
unworkability argument “[m]elodrama[tic]” and suggested that requiring at least 300 people to support 
a proposed plate should weed out frivolous plates, or, if that did not work, the state could stay out of 
controversial issues entirely. 742 F.3d 563, 575 (4th Cir. 2014). 
167 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015) (“The Town has ample content-neutral options available to 
resolve problems with safety and aesthetics.”). 
168 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 2252 (majority opinion). 
171 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474–77 (2009). 
172 Corbin, supra note 42, at 643 (“[T]he sheer number of specialty license plates offered makes it 
difficult to convincingly posit that any specific message is being promoted.”). 
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When the public does not know what the government is saying, 
accountability through the political process is highly unlikely.173 What the 
government means to say when it rejects an application to include private 
speech on government property potentially makes it even more unclear 
what the government’s message is. In Walker, it was clear that SCV’s plate 
was rejected because its logo was “offensive” to the public, but nothing in 
the Court’s opinion requires state actors to be clear about the reasons for 
rejection in the future in order to take advantage of the protections of the 
government speech doctrine.174 
Because Texas does not exercise any meaningful selectivity over the 
specialty license plates it chooses, the program appears to be some sort of 
forum like the one in Rosenberger, where the university did not “speak or 
subsidize . . . a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a 
diversity of views from private speakers.”175 By rejecting the SCV plate, 
Texas appears to be doing nothing but blatantly and impermissibly 
“manipulating private expression” in a viewpoint-based manner.176 
In Walker, the Court concludes that just as private individuals cannot 
be compelled to support the speech of the government, the government 
should not be compelled to support the speech of private individuals.177 
This sounds like the Court is holding that the government has First 
Amendment rights just like individuals.178 This is strange. Unlike private 
parties, the government is in fact legally required to support the speech of 
173 See Timothy Zick, Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum, 2010 BYU
L. REV. 2203, 2217 (2010). (“If the municipality is not required to identify a particularized message,
how are the people to know whether to be offended and object, to agree with the government’s
sentiment, or simply to ask for clarification?”).
174 Id. at 2218 (arguing that governments can speak through exclusion, but that it is not always 
clear “what message rejection conveys absent some explanation from officials.”). In Walker, the 
government message was particularly muddled because the state has given mixed messages about the 
Confederate flag. For example, the Texas State Capitol contains a number of monuments honoring 
Confederate soldiers, and the Confederate flag can be found for sale in the official state capitol gift 
shop. Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 11, Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (No. 14-144), 2015 WL 575158, 
at *11. In some cases, this type of inconsistency makes the Court reluctant to find government speech. 
See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 569–70 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting her reluctance to label the beef advertisements at issue as government speech given 
the conflicting messages about healthy eating that “the Government conveys in its own name”). 
175 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995). 
176 Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 543, 577 (1996). 
177 135 S. Ct. at 2253. 
178 See Gey, supra note 43, at 1259, 1262–63 (questioning the Court’s decision to grant the 
government “a First Amendment right to speak,” including the ability to silence or coerce the rights of 
its critics). 
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private individuals all the time under the public forum doctrine.179 Whether 
it is in the form of land or money, the government cannot engage in 
viewpoint discrimination among speakers, even though some people might 
reasonably but mistakenly believe that the government is supporting private 
expression. 
III. RAMIFICATIONS
The ramifications of Walker are potentially staggering. Using this 
decision as a guide, the government will likely assert the government 
speech doctrine in a wide variety of contexts in order to justify content-
based and even viewpoint-based censorship of private speech. 
Even before Walker, lower courts tended to give the government a 
wide berth to restrict speech. As Helen Norton put it in a provocatively 
titled article, Imaginary Threats to Government’s Expressive Interests, 
courts often appear overly concerned about protecting the government’s 
ability to distance itself from speech it does not like.180 These restrictions 
extend from the exclusion of individuals from government events,181 
restrictions on the speech of public school teachers and students,182 the 
censorship of government employees generally,183 and advertisements in 
public transportation.184 Walker will make it even easier for the government 
to claim that private speech is actually its own speech. 
179 See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2008 (2011) (“[The] [p]ublic 
forum doctrine acts as a government subsidy for speech.” (citing Rebecca Tushnet, Domain and Forum: 
Public Space, Public Freedom, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 597, 600 (2007)). 
180 Helen Norton, Imaginary Threats to Government’s Expressive Interests, 61 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1265, 1265 (2011). 
181 In Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010), the Tenth Circuit rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to the plaintiff’s removal from the audience during a 2005 speech from President 
Bush, pursuant to an official policy “excluding those who disagree with the President from the 
President’s official public appearances.” Id. at 1165. The court ruled in favor of the defendants on 
qualified immunity grounds without reaching the merits of the underlying claim. Id. at 1170. The court 
explained that it was not clear whether the President could be compelled to permit a dissenter from 
attending his speech. Id. (citing Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 199 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(upholding exclusion of individual from Bush–Quayle campaign rally)). 
182 For an extensive discussion of the First Amendment rights of K-12 public school teachers and 
students, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the First Amendment, 
90 N.C. L. Rev. 1597 (2012), and Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 
60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008). 
183 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006) (suggesting that its holding that public 
employees performing their job duties have no First Amendment rights is based on the government 
speech doctrine, as it “simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created”). For a more extensive discussion of the First Amendment rights of 
government employees, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government 
Employees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117 (2010). 
184 Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 502–03 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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The dissent warns of some of the ramifications of the majority’s 
expansive government speech doctrine. Justice Alito asks whether the 
government could now make viewpoint-based decisions about the content 
to appear on a government-controlled electronic billboard, simply because 
it controls it and owns it.185 Even worse, he warns, “[w]hat if a state college 
or university did the same thing with a similar billboard or a campus 
bulletin board or dorm list serve? What if it allowed private messages that 
are consistent with prevailing views on campus but banned those that 
disturbed some students or faculty?”186 These concerns are well taken. 
Walker solidifies the suggestion in Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System v. Southworth that the Court will consider a university to 
be the speaker in cases where “the challenged speech [is] financed by 
tuition dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its 
content.”187 After Walker, “responsibility” for content can be simply the 
exercise of final censorship authority; Walker does not require the 
government to be involved in any way with the development of the speech. 
Justice Alito’s comments reflect very legitimate concerns about the 
scope of Walker’s expansive conception of the government speech 
doctrine, limited only by a weak historical inquiry, an easily met ultimate 
control requirement, and a highly uncertain and malleable reasonable 
observer test that rests in large part upon the first two factors. As Part II.A 
argues, Justice Breyer’s history requirement will be no obstacle to claims 
that speech on public property is government speech. This prong does not 
require courts to inquire whether the government had the purpose to create 
a forum for private speech; as long as the government has exercised at least 
some control over the forum, it does not matter if it has not, in reality, 
exercised control over all of it. The control requirement will be even more 
easily met. After Walker, government actors will be wise to the need to 
assert control not over the development of the expressive content but 
merely final approval authority. Governments will be thrilled to censor 
speech if doing so perversely insulates them from constitutional challenges. 
185 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2256 (2015) (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
186 Id. Others sounded this same alarm bell after Summum. See, e.g., Zick, supra note 173, at 2229 
(“Under Summum’s identity conception, governmental entities could claim that parks, streets, 
classrooms, museums, subway platforms, university campuses, municipal buildings, public meetings, 
municipal websites, and other places are not public forums but tangible expressions of a governmental 
identity or image. Any private speech that is not consistent with that preferred image or identity would 
be subject to exclusion under the government speech principle.”). Indeed, some warned of this potential 
expansion long before that. See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 29, at 1443 (noting the possibility 
that the government could recharacterize the awarding of parade permits as an exercise of editorial 
discretion). 
187 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000). 
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Finally, after Walker, courts will be reluctant to use a reasonable observer 
test to reject a government speech defense when the history and control 
factors indicate otherwise. 
Walker is potentially dangerous because it will give the government 
much greater ability to restrict private speech whenever the government 
wants to avoid the appearance that it endorses it. As long as the 
government exercises control and a reasonable person might mistakenly 
attribute the speech to the government, the government speech doctrine 
potentially applies. For example, just two weeks after the Court released 
Walker, a federal district court judge relied on it to reject a First 
Amendment challenge to the government’s decision to cancel the 
registration of the “Redskins” trademark under the Lanham Act’s “may 
disparage” provision.188 The court explained that trademark registration 
“communicates the message that the federal government has approved the 
trademark”; “the public closely associates federal trademark registration 
with . . . the federal government’s recognition of the mark”; and the federal 
government exercises final authority to determine which marks to 
recognize.189 Arguably this case is not equivalent to Walker because it does 
not obviously implicate the public forum doctrine. Instead, it feels more 
like an unconstitutional conditions case. After Open Society, it might 
appear that the government would have to demonstrate some connection 
between its viewpoint-based discrimination and the trademark benefit. It 
would be difficult for the government to meet this burden. However, if 
Walker governs a broader range of government speech cases—and at least 
one federal district court judge thinks it does—then the much more easily 
met three-part Walker test applies. 
Walker may also impact the ability of municipalities to limit 
advertisements on public transportation. Courts around the country have 
been grappling with the constitutionality of restrictions on controversial 
advertisements.190 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the Supreme Court 
188 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 447, 454 (E.D. Va. 2015); see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(a) (2012). The Federal Circuit has since held that the issuance of trademarks is not government
speech and the “may disparage” provision of § 1052 violates the First Amendment. In re Tam, 808 F.3d
1321, 1345–46, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
189 Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 458–59. 
190 See, e.g., Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 503 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(dismissing First Amendment challenge to rejection of advertisement opposing U.S. support for Israel, 
as the decision was reasonable and viewpoint neutral); Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay 
Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 573–77 (1st Cir. 2015) (rejecting challenge to advertising policy rejecting 
“demeaning” or “disparaging” ads); Coleman v. Ann Arbor Transp. Auth., 904 F. Supp. 2d 670, 691–96 
(E.D. Mich. 2012) (holding unconstitutional transit advertising policy prohibiting ads that are not “in 
good taste” or that “defame[] or [are] likely to hold up to scorn or ridicule a person or group of 
persons”). In March 2016, the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in a case 
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upheld a public transit advertising policy that prohibited political 
advertising.191 This decision long predated the emergence of the 
government speech doctrine, but one reason the Court’s plurality gave for 
upholding a policy that excluded all political speech was to avoid “the 
appearance of favoritism.”192 Justice Brennan’s dissent criticized the 
majority for accepting this argument: “The endorsement of an opinion 
expressed in an advertisement on a motor coach is no more attributable to 
the transit district than the view of a speaker in a public park is to the city 
administration or the tenets of an organization using school property for 
meetings is to the local school board.”193 Lehman is therefore not 
inconsistent with the application of the government speech doctrine to 
public transit advertising restrictions.194 
To be sure, Walker specifically distinguished specialty license plates 
from advertising space on city buses, noting that in Lehman “the messages 
were located in a context (advertising space) that is traditionally available 
for private speech,” and this space “bore no indicia that the speech was 
owned or conveyed by the government.”195 But this effort to distinguish 
Lehman is dicta, and it is not particularly convincing. All three prongs of 
the new Walker test are arguably met in the context of public transit 
advertising. It is doubtful that specialty license plates have existed 
significantly longer than advertising on public transportation. As with 
license plates, municipalities have long used spaces on and surrounding its 
public transportation systems to communicate government messages and 
more recently opened up these spaces to private speakers as a way of 
making money. Observers would certainly understand that the walls of a 
bus or a train are government property, and it is hard to say it is any less 
reasonable than it was in Walker for them to assume—mistakenly—that the 
involving advertising restrictions in a municipal transit system. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King 
Cty., 136 S. Ct. 1022 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). Justice Thomas, 
joined by Justice Alito, dissented from this denial, arguing that the “case offers an ideal opportunity to 
bring clarity to an important area of First Amendment law.” Id. at 1023. Justice Thomas contended that 
King County’s advertising policy contained “problematic content-based [speech] restrictions”; although 
some regard the speech at issue offensive, he noted “[t]hat is all the more reason to grant review.” Id. at 
1025.  
191 418 U.S. 298, 299–304 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
192 Id. at 304. 
193 Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 
434 P.2d 982, 989 (Cal. 1967)). 
194 See Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., 155 F. Supp. 3d 843, 850 
(N.D. Ind.) (finding that a public bus advertising program “involves neither government speech nor a 
public forum”), rev’d, 826 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2016); Coleman, 904 F. Supp. at 696–97 (rejecting 
argument that bus advertisements are government speech).  
195 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2252 (2015). 
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government endorsed any message posted on those walls. Finally, most 
municipalities would be able to demonstrate that they have exercised just as 
much if not greater control over the approval of advertisements than Texas 
exercises over the approval of specialty license plates. 
Walker may have the most dramatic impact on the free speech rights 
of government employees and public school students. In both of these 
contexts, the scope of the government’s power to restrict speech is 
somewhat unclear. In the context of public school student speech rights, for 
example, the Court decided in Hazelwood that public schools could restrict 
speech for legitimate pedagogical reasons when such speech bore the 
“imprimatur” of the school.196 Lower courts have relied extensively on 
Hazelwood to determine the First Amendment rights of students at both the 
secondary and higher education levels.197 Under the government speech 
doctrine established in Walker, the determination of whether speech bears 
the “imprimatur” of the school will depend on the perspective of the 
reasonable person looking at the relevant history and government control of 
the type of expressive activity at issue. Given that schools have historically 
at least tried to exercise control and final approval authority over student 
speech, Walker makes it easier to conclude that a reasonable person would 
think that the student speaks for the school. Again, the more offensive the 
speech, the more likely the reasonable person will think that the school is 
tolerating and thereby endorsing the speech, rather than simply recognizing 
that students enjoy constitutional rights, too. 
This is not fanciful speculation. Indeed, schools have already been 
making these sorts of arguments. For example, a district court in Alabama 
recently held that the University of South Alabama could limit a student 
group’s right to engage in a pro-life protest on the campus perimeter 
because “the University could reasonably believe that authorizing student 
196 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–73 (1988). 
197 See, e.g., Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Hazelwood for support in rejecting high school cheerleader’s claim that she should not be required to 
cheer for her alleged attacker, the court explained that “[i]n her capacity as cheerleader, [she] served as 
a mouthpiece through which SISD could disseminate speech—namely, support for its athletic teams”); 
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1286–92 (10th Cir. 2004) (using Hazelwood to analyze a 
student’s argument that she had a First Amendment right not to say words she found offensive). For an 
extensive discussion of the use of Hazelwood to justify speech restrictions in educational settings, see 
Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification Cases, 11 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 382 (2013); Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach 
to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 73–90 (2008) (observing that courts 
have not only “invoked Hazelwood in a tremendous array of student speech cases, in almost every 
conceivable context from kindergarten through high school,” but also have extended its reach to 
“teachers’ classroom speech, outside-entity speech, and speech that reflects district-level decisions 
about textbooks and curricula”). 
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speech in the Perimeter concerning divisive issues risked public perception 
that it endorsed or approved of the viewpoints there expressed.”198 
Rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that the protection of free speech is 
essential in a university setting, the court instead embraced the defendant’s 
argument that “the free exchange of ideas is enhanced when the 
government does not place its imprimatur on one set of ideas.”199 The court 
found that controversial student speech appearing on the portions of 
university property that are “most exposed to direct observation by the 
general public” threatened this legitimate interest in neutrality.200 Although 
the court did not rely explicitly on Walker, its reliance on a reasonable 
observer inquiry suggests the holding is consistent with that case.201  
In other cases, universities have expressly relied on Walker to argue 
that they can discriminate on the basis of viewpoint among student 
groups.202 Iowa State University (ISU), for example, relied on Walker when 
arguing that it should be permitted to engage in viewpoint-based decisions 
when determining which groups to license its trademark. ISU contended 
that “it uses the trademarks to promote the ISU brand, which it uses to 
attract prospective students, garner public and private funding, and recruit 
employees.”203 ISU claimed reasonable observers “believe ISU licenses its 
marks to convey its preferred views,” citing as proof the public backlash to 
the use of the trademark by a student group favoring the legalization of 
marijuana.204 The court rejected the university’s government speech 
argument, but not without some difficulty. The court conceded that 
trademarks “are frequently used to associate a product or image with the 
mark’s owner,” but noted ISU failed to present sufficient evidence in the 
record that the general public believed ISU promoted the marijuana legal 
198 Students for Life USA v. Waldrop, No. CV 14-0157-WS-B, 2016 WL 707028, at *15 (S.D. 
Ala. Feb. 22, 2016). The court cited an Eleventh Circuit opinion that also relied explicitly on Walker to 
conclude that a reasonable observer would believe that a school endorsed banners for school sponsors 
hanging on secondary schools’ fences. Id. at *15 (citing Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 
1070, 1076–78 (11th Cir. 2015)). 
199 Waldrop, 2016 WL 707028, at *14. 
200 Id.  
201 Disturbingly, when discussing the understanding of the general public, the court assumed that 
“[w]hile this group will include persons with a[n] . . . understanding of the relevant concepts” from high 
school civics that a school does not endorse or support student speech, it merely permits it on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, “it will also include persons never adequately exposed to them and those 
whose grasp of them has faded.” Id. at *15. 
202 See, e.g., Gerlich v. Leath, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1175–76 (S.D. Iowa) (rejecting Iowa State 
University’s argument that it could deny a trademark license to a student group in favor of the 
legalization of marijuana under Walker because reasonable observers would know the history of 
“universities as incubators for intellectual experiment and exploration”), appeal filed, (Mar. 1, 2016). 
203 Id. at 1174. 
204 Id. 
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reform.205 Surely the next university making a government speech argument 
will make sure to present such evidence. The court also begrudgingly noted 
that Walker’s “effective control” element was satisfied because ISU 
exercised final approval authority.206 The court discounted the importance 
of this factor and concluded that because “American society regards its 
universities as incubators for intellectual experiment and exploration,” 
observers would not associate ISU with the views of all of its student 
groups.207 Note the obvious tension between this assumption of what a 
reasonable person understands about the role of universities in fostering 
free speech and the very different “neutrality” approach the court took in 
the University of South Alabama case. 
Walker will potentially have the most significant impact on student 
athletes who might otherwise challenge restrictions on their ability to use 
social media or communicate with the press. These bans have come into 
place after student athletes have posted disparaging remarks about their 
teammates, coaches, or opposing teams; pictures of underage drinking or 
other inappropriate behavior; or apparent violations of NCAA’s rules.208 
For example, the University of North Carolina (UNC) Department of 
Athletics’ official policy for student athletes now specifically requires that 
a coach or administrator must have access to, monitor, or receive reports 
about all student athlete social media accounts.209 The UNC policy makes 
clear that UNC is not simply looking for potential NCAA violations; it 
warns student athletes that playing for UNC “is a privilege, not a right” and 
that “[a]s a student-athlete, you represent the University and you are 
expected to portray yourself, your team, and the University in a positive 
manner at all times.”210 Many other universities have similar social media 
205 Id. at 1175. 
206 Id.  
207 Id. at 1175–76.  
208 See John Browning, Universities Monitoring Social Media Accounts of Student-Athletes: A 
Recipe for Disaster, 75 TEX. B.J. 840, 840–43 (2012) (“In Orwellian fashion, college and university 
athletic departments across the country are mandating that competing in varsity sports comes with a 
hefty price tag: one’s right to privacy and the protections afforded by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.”); Jimmy Sanderson, To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Exploring 
Division I Athletic Departments’ Social-Media Policies, 4 INT’L J. SPORTS COMM. 492, 493 (2011), 
http://journals.humankinetics.com/AcuCustom/Sitename/Documents/DocumentItem/08_Sanderson%20
IJSC_2011_0016_p492-513.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQZ4-YC9G]; Frank B. Butts, NCAA Athletes and 
Facebook, 11 SPORT J. (2008), http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA210520254 
&v=2.1&u=northwestern&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&asid=d835d5e928a35a2eeb1f761bc15f36ad
[https://perma.cc/EV4W-ZH5D].   
209  THE UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL DEP’T OF ATHLETICS, POLICY ON STUDENT-ATHLETE 
SOCIAL NETWORKING AND MEDIA USE (2012), http://www.goheels.com/fls/3350/pdf/
Compliance/SocialNetworkingPolicy.pdf?SPID=111196 [https://perma.cc/832F-XA9C]. 
210 Id. 
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bans and monitoring policies in place for their athletes.211 These new 
policies arguably satisfy Walker’s control element. The only question is 
whether a reasonable person thinks these students are speaking for the 
school. Many reasonable people believe that student athletes on high-
profile teams such as basketball and football are public figures who 
represent the school, and that therefore schools should not be required to 
tolerate communications that embarrass the team and the school. After 
Walker, the exercise of control, which in turn informs the fictional 
reasonable observer, suggests this belief is reasonable.212 
Like public school students, government employees are also likely to 
find themselves with even less protection for their speech activities after 
Walker. As discussed in Part I, the Court has indicated that the government 
speech doctrine applies to any speech in which an employee engages in 
while within the scope of her job duties. As with students, courts might 
read Walker as providing governments with the power to restrict the “off-
duty” speech of its employees as long as a reasonable observer might 
believe that the employer’s willingness to tolerate the offensive speech is 
equivalent to endorsing the speech. Public school teachers, for example, are 
frequently punished for their offensive “off-duty” speech.213 
It is easy to criticize Walker and lament its implications; it is harder to 
offer an alternative approach. But Open Society’s focus on the connection 
between the speech restriction and the contours of the government program 
offers a promising approach for the government speech doctrine as a 
whole. Rather than focusing on simply whether the government is 
controlling speech and whether the reasonable person would think the 
government has endorsed private speech, the Open Society inquiry would 
cabin in an otherwise overly expansive government speech doctrine so that 
it applies only when there is a close connection between the speech 
restriction and the purposes of the government program at issue. In the 
211 See Kayleigh R. Mayer, Colleges and Universities All Atwitter: Constitutional Implications of 
Regulating and Monitoring Student-Athletes’ Twitter Usage, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 455, 471–72 
(2013) (discussing social media policies for student athletes around the country). 
212 The “history” inquiry would arguably support the students, given that schools have not 
historically subjected the speech of their student athletes to such rigorous control and monitoring. It 
depends, however, on how a court would frame the relevant historical inquiry. Schools have generally 
exercised control over their student athletes’ social media accounts for most (albeit not all) of their 
existence. Furthermore, given the relative youth of social media as a communications platform, some 
courts are likely to discount the history prong entirely. See, e.g., Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 
806 F.3d 1070, 1075–76 (11th Cir. 2015) (discounting a lack of history of advertising banners on fences 
at public schools, reasoning that a lack of history “is not a prerequisite for government speech”) 
(emphasis in original)). 
213 For a detailed discussion of the free speech rights of public school teachers, see Papandrea 
Social Media, supra note 182. 
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context of specialty license plates, the Court should have recognized that 
the primary purpose of the specialty license program is to serve as a 
fundraising program. Although other specialty license plate cases may 
present closer calls, particularly where the legislatures themselves authorize 
the creation of plates, it is plain that Texas was not using the hundreds of 
specialty license plates to proclaim a particular government message or to 
promote a particular government objective.  
The government is not a private entity entitled to protect its brand 
from dilution. Under well-established First Amendment principles, the 
government is required to support the speech of private speakers. A focus 
on reasonable observers who erroneously believe this tolerance operates as 
endorsement threaten the future of free speech rights in this country. 
CONCLUSION 
Walker is likely to have much more far-reaching effects than the 
seemingly trivial issue of specialty license plates. By permitting the 
government to defeat First Amendment claims based on the easily satisfied 
three-part test the Court embraced in Walker, the Court raises the potential 
for an expansive government speech doctrine that defeats First Amendment 
rights in a wide variety of settings. Requiring a connection between the 
speech restriction and the government program is one promising approach 
to limiting this dangerous doctrine. 
